Abstract-In this paper, we investigate the physical-layer security of cooperative communications relying on multiple two-way relays using the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol in the presence of an eavesdropper, where the eavesdropper appears to tap the transmissions of both the source and of the relay. The design tradeoff to be resolved is that the throughput is improved by invoking two-way relaying, but the secrecy of wireless transmissions may be degraded, since the eavesdropper may overhear the signals transmitted by both the source and relay nodes. We conceive an artificial noise aided two-way opportunistic relay selection (ANaT-WORS) scheme for enhancing the security of the pair of source nodes communicating with the assistance of multiple two-way relays. Furthermore, we analyze both the outage probability and intercept probability of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme, where the security and reliability are characterized in terms of the intercept probability and the security outage probability. For comparison, we also provide the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) analysis of both the traditional direct transmission and of the one-way relaying schemes. It is shown that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme outperforms both the conventional direct transmission, as well as the one-way relay methods in terms of its SRT. More specifically, in the low main-user-to-eavesdropper ratio (MUER) region, the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is capable of guaranteeing secure transmissions, whereas no SRT gain is achieved by conventional one-way relaying. In fact, the one-way relaying scheme may even be inferior to the traditional direct transmission scheme in terms of its SRT.
Security-Reliability Tradeoff Analysis of Artificial Noise Aided Two-Way Opportunistic Relay Selection community, since it is capable of mitigating both the shadowing and fast-fading effects of wireless channels. There are two popular relaying protocols, namely the amplify-and-forward (AF) [1] , [2] as well as the decode-and-forward (DF) [3] , [4] . In the case of AF relaying, the selected relay multiplies its received signals by a gain factor and then forward them to the destination [1] , [2] . By contrast, the DF relay decodes its received signals and then the selected relay forward its decoded signal to the destination [3] , [4] . Additionally, in [5] , both AF and DF relaying schemes are investigated. In general, closer to the source, DF relaying has a high probability of successful decoding and flawless retransmission from the relay to the destination from a reduced distance [6] . By contrast, close to the destination the DF relay has just as bad reception as the destination itself, hence it often inflicts error propagation. Fortunately in the vicinity of the destination AF relying tends to outperform DF relaying [6] . Additionally, [7] also shows that adaptive DF outperforms AF in terms of its frame error rate (FER).
At the time of writing this paper, physical-layer security [8] , [9] in cooperative relay networks is receiving a growing research attention as benefit of its capability of protecting wireless communications against eavesdropping attacks. In [10] and [11] , the physical-layer security of multi-input multi-output (MIMO)-aided relaying networks has been explored, demonstrating that the secrecy capacity can indeed be improved by using MIMOaided relays. Additionally, Tekin and Yener [12] proposed the cooperative jamming philosophy, and studied the attainable secrecy rate with the objective of improving the physical-layer security. As a further development, Long et al. [13] investigated cooperative jamming schemes in bidirectional secrecy communications. In [14] and [15] , beamforming techniques have been investigated and significant wireless secrecy capability improvements were demonstrated with the aid of beamforming techniques. Additionally, the impact of antenna selection on secure two-way relaying communications has been analyzed in [16] .
As a design alternative, relay selection schemes may also be used for improving the physical-layer security of wireless communications. One-way relaying has been analyzed in [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Specifically, hybrid relaying and jamming schemes are explored in [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . In [17] [18] [19] , joint AF relaying and jammer selection schemes have been investigated. Additionally, hybrid cooperative beamforming and cooperative jamming have been proposed in [20] and [21] . In [22] , joint DF relaying and cooperative jamming schemes have been investigated. Moreover, in [23] , the AF-and DF-based optimal relay selection 0018-9545 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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schemes have been proposed. The associated intercept probabilities have also been analyzed in the context of both AF-and DFbased one-way relaying schemes, where an eavesdropper is only capable of wiretapping the transmissions of the relays. By contrast, in [24] , an eavesdropper was tapping the transmissions of both the source and of the relays. Moreover, the securityreliability tradeoff (SRT) has been explored in the context of the proposed opportunistic relay selection scheme in the high mainuser-to-eavesdropper ratio (MUER) region, where the MUER is defined as the ratio of the average channel gain of the main links (spanning from the source to the destination) to that of the wiretap links (spanning from the source to the eavesdropper). Additionally, two-way relaying has been explored in [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . Specifically, Mo et al. [25] investigated two-way AF relaying schemes relying on either two slots or three slots demonstrated that the three-slot scheme performs better than the two-slot scheme, when the transmitted source powers approach zero.
In [26] , DF relaying has been invoked for improving the wireless security of bidirectional communications, where a relay is invoked for transmitting artificial noise in order to perturb the eavesdropper's reception both in the first and in the second transmission slot. In [27] , joint relay and jammer selection of two-way relay networks have been proposed. In [28] , Wang et al. explored hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming of two-way relay networks. In [29] , secure relay and jammer selection was conceived for the physical-layer security improvement of a wireless network having multiple intermediate nodes and eavesdroppers, where the links between the source and the eavesdropper are not considered. In [30] , three different categories of relay and jammer selection have been considered, where the channel coefficients between the legitimate nodes and the eavesdroppers are used both for relay selection and for jammer selection. In [31] , a wireless network consisting of two source nodes is considered and multiple DF relay nodes are involved in the presence of a single eavesdropper. The outage probability (OP) has been analyzed for the two-way DF scheme relying on three transmission slots. Motivated by the above considerations, we investigate a wireless network supporting a pair of source nodes with the aid of N two-way DF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper. In contrast to [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] , we explore a two-way relaying aided wireless network. Furthermore, we propose an artificial noise aided twoway opportunistic relay selection (ANaTWORS) scheme, and analyze the SRT of the wireless network investigated. Due to the channel state information (CSI) estimation error, it is impossible to guarantee that no interference is received at the relay nodes, caused by the specially designed artificial noise. Moreover, the impact of the artificial noise both on the relays and on the eavesdropper is characterized, which will be taken into account when evaluating the wireless SRT of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme. Against this background, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
First, we propose an ANaTWORS scheme for protecting the ongoing transmissions against eavesdropping. To be specific, in the first time slot, S 1 transmits its signals to the relays, and S 2 transmits artificial noise in order to protect the signals transmitted by S 1 against eavesdropping. Similarly to the first time slot, S 2 transmits its signals to the relays in the second time slot under the protection of artificial noise transmitted by S 1 . In the third time slot, the relay forward the encoded signals to S 1 and S 2 .
Second, we present the mathematical SRT analysis of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme in the presence of artificial noise imposed both on the relays and on the eavesdropper for transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. Moreover, we assume that the teletraffic of S 1 and S 2 is different. Closed-form expressions are obtained both for the OP and for the intercept probability (IP) of both S 1 and S 2 .
Finally, it is shown that as the impact of artificial noise on the main link is reduced and on the wiretap link is increased, the SRT of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is improved. Furthermore, our performance evaluations reveal that the proposed ANaOTWRS scheme consistently outperforms both the traditional direct transmission regime and the one-way transmission scheme [24] in terms of its SRT.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we briefly characterize the physical-layer security of a two-way wireless network. In Section III, the SRT analysis of the conventional direct transmission scheme as well as of the proposed ANaOTWRS scheme communicating over a Rayleigh channel is carried out. Our performance evaluations are detailed in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELAY SELECTION

A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a wireless network consisting of a pair of source nodes, denoted by S 1 and S 2 , plus N two-way DF relays, denoted by R i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper E, where E is assumed to be within the coverage area of S 1 , S 2 , and R i . All nodes are equipped with a single antenna. We assume that there is no direct link between S 1 and S 2 due to the path loss. Furthermore, in the spirit of [21] , both the main and the wiretap links are modeled by Rayleigh fading channels, where the main and wiretap links are represented by the solid and dashed lines in Fig. 1 The thermal noise of any node is modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable with a zero mean and a variance of N 0 , denoted by n s 1 , n s 2 , n i , and n e , respectively. Following [31] , the operation of the two-way DF scheme relying on opportunistic relay selection is split into three time slots. We assume that the nodes in the network are synchronized with each other. In the first time slot, S 1 transmits its signal, denoted by x s 1 to the relays, and then S 2 transmits the artificial noise ω s 2 simultaneously. In the second time slot, S 2 transmits its signal x s 2 to the relays and S 1 transmits artificial noise simultaneously. In the third time slot, the selected relay forward the signal x r to both S 1 and S 2 , where we have x r = x s 1 ⊕ x s 2 , and ⊕ denotes the XOR operation. Furthermore, the proposed relay selection can be coordinated by relying on a distributed pattern (governed by a timer). Without loss of generality, we assume
. Furthermore, we also assume that S 1 and S 2 have to convey different-rate traffic, denoted by R s 1 and R s 2 , respectively. For comparison, the one-way relaying scheme (ORS) of [24] can be simply extended to a two-way scenario relying on four time slots. To be specific, S 1 transmits its signals to the relays in the first time slot, S 2 transmits its signals to the relays in the second time slot, and the selected relay forward the decoded signals to S 2 and S 1 in the third time slot and the fourth time slot, respectively.
B. Two-Way Relaying Scheme
In this section, we first consider the physical-layer security of the two-way relaying scheme. We then propose our ANaT-WORS arrangement.
1) S 1 and S 2 Transmit: In the first time slot, S 1 transmits its signal to the relays under the protection of artificial noise transmitted by S 2 . For the sake of a fair power consumption comparison with both the direct transmission and the ORS schemes, the total transmit power of S 1 and S 2 is constrained to P s , thus the transmit powers of S 1 and S 2 are denoted by P s /2. As mentioned above, it is impossible to guarantee that the artificial noise perfectly lies in the null space of the S 1 − R i channels, due to the ubiquitous CSI estimation error, hence leading to a certain interference received at R i . The impact of the artificial noise on R i is quantified by α. The signals received at R i transmitted by S 1 can be expressed as
(
From (1), the achievable rate of the S 1 − R i link can be expressed as
where the factor 1/3 arises from the fact that three orthogonal time slots are required for completing the signal transmission from S 1 to S 2 via R i . Naturally, the artificial noise is specially designed to interfere with the eavesdropper. However, its perturbation imposed on the eavesdropper may be imperfect due to CSI estimation errors, which is characterized by β. Hence, the signals received at E from S 1 can be expressed as
From (3), the achievable rate of the S 1 − E link can be formulated as
In the second time slot, S 2 transmits its signals to the relay nodes, and S 1 simultaneously transmits artificial noise. Similarly, the signals received at R i transmitted by S 2 can be expressed as
Using (5), the achievable rate of the S 2 − R i link is given by
Similarly, the signals received at E from S 2 can be represented as
while the achievable rate of the
2) Decoding Set:
In this section, we analyze the successful decoding set of the wireless network portrayed in Fig. 1 . As shown in [24] , the resultant successful decoding set of the ORS scheme is given by Ω, where
denotes the empty set and Φ n represents the nth nonempty subset of the N relays, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 N − 1}. The successful decoding sets of the relays defined as those that are capable of successfully decoding x s 1 and x s 2 are denoted by Ω 1 and Ω 2 , respectively. Consequently, the set of the relays that successfully decode both x s 1 and x s 2 is denoted by Ψ, which is formulated as Ψ = {φ,
For example, the decoding sets of Ω j and Ψ have been shown as Table I , where we have N = 3 and j ∈ {1, 2}. As mentioned above, the event of Φ = φ can be characterized as
while the event of Φ = Φ n can be expressed as
whereΦ n represents the complementary set of Φ n .
3) Relay Transmits: Without loss of generality, here we assume that R i is selected from the set Φ n . Then the selected relay R i broadcasts the encoded signal x r to S 1 and S 2 . The signals received at S 1 from R i can be written as
The source S 1 may invoke successive interference cancelation (SIC), thus, (18) can be written as
The achievable rate of the R i − S 1 link can be expressed as
Similarly, S 2 can also invoke SIC, thus the signals received at S 2 from R i can be written as
The achievable rate of the R i − S 2 link can be obtained as
The signals received at E from R i can be written as
4) An Optimal Two-Way Relay Selection Criterion:
In this section, we present the relay selection criterion of the ANaTWORS scheme, which can be given by
where o denotes the selected optimal relay. Moreover, from a more practical point of view, the CSIs |h is 1 | 2 and |h is 2 | 2 can be estimated in practical wireless communications, using channel estimation schemes [32] .
5) Condition of Intercept Event:
In the Φ = φ case, an eavesdropper can successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S 1 , when C s s 1 e > R s 1 
The achievable rate of the R o − E link can be formulated as
Clearly, in the Φ = Φ n and C 
III. SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we analyze both the OP and IP of the proposed ANaTWORS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels.
A. SRT Analysis of the Proposed ANaTWORS Scheme 1) SRT Analysis of S 1 :
In the ANaTWORS scheme, a relay will only be chosen from the set Φ n . With the aid of Shannon [33] and the law of total probability [34] , the OP of the S 1 → S 2 link relying on the ANaTWORS scheme can be formulated as
In the case of Φ = φ, no relay is chosen for forwarding the signals, which leads to C os 2 = 0 for Φ = φ. Thus, (20) can be rewritten as
Based on (9) and (10), (21) can be expressed as
where we have
Based on Appendix A, Pr(
(23) According to Appendix B, Pr(|h os 2 | 2 < Δ 1 )) can be expressed as
Substituting (23) and (24) into (22), P single out s 1 can be obtained. In our ANaTWORS scheme, an eavesdropper can overhear the signals transmitted by S 1 , S 2 , and R i . Using the law of total probability [34] and the definition of an intercept event, we can express the IP of the S 1 → E link as
Using (4), (8) , and (19), (25) can be expressed as
According to Appendix C, 
According to Appendix D, Pr(|h oe | 2 > Δ 1 ) can be formulated as
Substituting (27) and (28) into (26), P single int s 1 can be obtained.
2) SRT Analysis of S 2 :
Similarly to S 1 , the OP of S 2 can be expressed as
Meanwhile, the IP of S 2 can be shown to obey 
and
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION For comparison, the SRT analysis of the conventional direct transmission scheme operating without relays is also provided. The total IP and OP of S 1 and S 2 with the traditional direct transmission scheme is defined as
and In this section, we present both our numerical and simulation results for the traditional direct transmission, as well as for the ORS [24] and for the ANaTWORS schemes in terms of their SRTs. Moreover, the analytic IP versus OP results of the direct transmission and ANaTWORS schemes are obtained by plotting (33) , (34), (31) , and (32), respectively. It is pointed that the IP versus OP results of the ORS scheme are calculated from (27) and (19) of [24] , where α is rewritten as (2
We first consider the effect of different MUERs. Fig. 2 depicts the SRTs of both the direct transmission, of the ORS [24] and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different MUERs. Both the numerical and simulation results characterizing the SRT of the ANaTWORS scheme are provided in this figure. Observe from Fig. 2 that as the MUER decreases, all the IPs of the direct transmission, of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS schemes are increased, which can be explained by observing that upon decreasing the MUER, an eavesdropper can achieve a higher achievable rate. Moreover, Fig. 2 also illustrates that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme generally has a lower IP than the traditional direct transmission and ORS regime for MUER = 3 dB and MUER = 0 dB. Additionally, the difference between the analytic and simulated IP versus OP curves [24, (33) , (34) and [27] ], [ (24), (19)], and (31) and (32). Fig. 3 . IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS schemes for different number of relays associated with an MUER of λ m e = 0 dB, which were calculated from [24, (33) , (34) and [27] ], [(24), (19) ], and (31) and (32) .
of the ANaTWORS scheme is negligible, demonstrating the accuracy of our SRT analysis.
In Fig. 3 , we show the IP verus OP performance of both the direct transmission, as well as of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS scheme for different number of relays N . We can observe from Fig. 3 that as the number of relays N increases from N = 4 to 8, the IP of all schemes is reduced at a specific OP, which means that increasing the number of relays improves the security versus reliability tradeoff of wireless transmissions. Additionally, Fig. 3 also demonstrates that IP versus OP performance of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is better than that of the direct transmission and of the ORS schemes for all the N values considered. [24, (33) , (34) and [27] ], [ (24), (19)], and (31) and (32). Fig. 4 also illustrates that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme outperforms the direct transmission, the ORS and the OSJ-MMISR schemes in terms of its IP versus OP tradeoff for both the (β, α) = (0.95, 0.06) and (β, α) = (0.99, 0.02) cases, since the CSI of the eavesdropper links cannot be readily acquired, the CSIs of the wiretap links are not taken into account in the proposed ANaTWORS scheme. For the sake of a fair comparison, the CSIs of the wiretap links in the OSJ-MMISR scheme [30] are not considered either. Fig. 5 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission, of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different tele-traffic ratios of S 1 and S 2 , namely, for R s 1 /R s 2 = 0.5, R s 1 /R s 2 = 1, and R s 1 /R s 2 = 2. Observe from Fig. 5 that the ANaTWORS scheme performs best for R s 1 /R s 2 = 1. Moreover, the difference remains modest for asymmetric traffic ratios of both R s 1 /R s 2 = 0.5 and R s 1 /R s 2 = 2. This is due to the fact that for a fixed power allocation case, some of the power will be wasted, when the instantaneous channel gain is sufficiently high and the traffic demand is low. Additionally, no beneficial reliability improvement is achieved, despite degrading the security. This is interesting, hence we will adopt an adaptive power allocation scheme for improving the security of wireless transmissions in our future research. Finally, Fig. 5 also illustrates that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme performs better than the direct transmission and ORS schemes for all three traffic-ratios considered. [24, (33) , (34) and [27] ], [ (24), (19)], and (31) and (32). Fig. 6 . IP x OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS schemes with λ m e = 0 dB and N = 8, which were calculated from [24, (33) , (34) and [27] ], [(24), (19) ], and (31) and (32). Fig. 6 illustrates the (IP x OP) product of the direct transmission, of the ORS, and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different SNRs. Observe from Fig. 6 that upon increasing the SNR, all the schemes can exhibit an (IP x OP) peak, but the maximum (IP x OP) product of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is smallest of the three schemes, which demonstrates its superiority.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an ANaTWORS scheme for a wireless network consisting of the pair of source nodes S 1 and S 2 , and multiple two-way relays R i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, communicating in the presence of an eavesdropper. We analyzed the SRT performance of both the ANaTWORS and of the traditional direct transmission schemes. Moreover, due to the presence of CSI estimation errors, it was impossible to guarantee that the specially designed artificial noise was projected onto the null space of R i , hence resulting in a certain amount of interference imposed on the relays. Hence, the self-interference and the interference factors were taken into account for characterizing the wireless SRTs of the proposed ANaTWORS, where the security and reliability are quantified in terms of the IP and OP, respectively. It was also illustrated that the ANaTWORS scheme outperforms both the conventional direct transmission and the ORS schemes in terms of its (IP x OP) product. Furthermore, as the number of relays increases, the SRT of the ANaTWORS scheme improves.
Here, we only explored the allocation of a fixed power to the source nodes and relays nodes. In our future work, we will adopt an adaptive power allocation scheme in this scenario. Specifically, the power can be dynamically allocated according to the near instantaneous channel gain and the traffic demands of users. 
Hence, Pr( 
APPENDIX B
Using the law of total probability [34] , the term Pr(|h os 2 | 2 < Δ 1 ) can be rewritten as
and ), respectively. Thus, Υ 0 can be rewritten as
Noting that RVs |h j s 1 | 2 and |h j s 2 | 2 are exponentially distributed and independent of each other, based on [18] , we have Pr(X j < y)
). Thus, j ∈Φ n −{i} Pr(X j < y) can be expanded as
where A n (m) represents the mth nonempty subset of Φ n − {i}, and |A n (m)| denotes the cardinality of the subset A n (m). σ 
Substituting (B.4) into (B.3) yields
where |Φ n | denotes the cardinality of the set Φ n . Now Υ 1 can be rewritten as
Similarly to (B.4), j ∈Φ n −{i} Pr(X j < x) can be expressed as
Substituting (B.7) into (B.6) yields
(B.8)
Using (B.5) and (B.8), Υ 0 + Υ 1 can be expressed as 
